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A B S T R A C T   
How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more 
inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using 
Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article 
examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections 
and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in na-
tional and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no 
sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of 
political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes 
discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics.   
1. Introduction 
In the recent past, a large and growing literature on distributive 
politics has documented how incumbents allocate collective resources to 
obtain electoral advantages. The underlying assumption is that the goal 
of politicians is exquisitely electoral, highly partisan, and ultimately a 
function of attempts at political survival (Golden and Min, 2013, p.74). 
There is a wide range of practices when trying to win office. Studies of 
political budget cycles emphasize that fiscal policies tend to fluctuate 
along election cycles (De Haan and Klomp, 2013). Another strand has 
focused on favouritism to improve the expectations of fellow candidates 
(Lara and Toro, 2019; Migueis, 2013). One last venue wonders what 
strategy yields the highest returns in the polls, targeting core or swing 
constituencies (Kang, 2015; Kauder et al., 2016). 
Often considered a feature of authoritarian regimes or weak de-
mocracies, data suggests that such behaviour is not restricted to certain 
political systems. A review of tactical redistributions includes formal 
democracies with authoritarian features like Mexico under the PRI 
(Magaloni, 2006) or AKP’s Turkey (Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2019); 
developing democracies like Argentina (Remmer, 2007), Brazil (Sakurai 
and Menezes-Filho, 2011) and Peru (Schady, 2000); and advanced de-
mocracies like the Nordic Countries (Tavits, 2009), Spain (Curto-Grau 
et al., 2018) or Greece (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2016). 
Despite the evidence, we still lack knowledge on how strategies vary 
in time as democratic practices settle. We know that the quality of 
government is better in democratic states than in authoritarian ones, but 
what happens in the transition? Are incumbents more inclined to be 
opportunistic during the early years, or when the rules of the game are 
well established? One may argue that greater experience eventually 
reduces the scope. Initially, institutions, political parties and voters need 
to adapt to the new scenario, and in such circumstances, incumbents will 
try to capture state resources and extend their control over different 
government tiers. Moreover, the chances for fiscal opportunism are 
fuelled by the absence of reliable information and well-established 
checks-and-balances. As democracies mature, civic culture and control 
mechanisms spread, hence, the possibilities for engaging in strategic 
policymaking vanish. However, an alternative hypothesis seems also 
plausible. The consolidation of democratic practices leads to higher 
levels of electoral competition, which increases incumbents’ incentives 
to manipulate the economy. As a result, officeholders see their position 
under threat, and at that point, they will try to redistribute resources in a 
way that increases their chances in the next race. 
This discussion indicates that the effect of democratization on 
distributive politics is a trade-off between incentives and constraints: as 
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democracy consolidates, politicians have greater incentives to target 
goods electorally, but institutional constraints prevent them from taking 
that advantage. We argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a re- 
composition of the strategy. Initially, the low rivalry and the lack of 
checks-and-balances lead to focus on core constituencies because it is a 
safer tactic to maintain the status quo that allowed winning elections. As 
competition increases and control mechanisms spread, a change in the 
procedure operates. Concentrating in strongholds is no longer enough, 
but to appeal a broader set of voters is needed. The strategy shifts from 
targeting core voters to increasing transfers across the board ahead 
elections. 
In order to test these ideas, the paper explores the role played by 
electoral incentives in the distribution of investment to municipalities in 
Chile after Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. The analysis inspects two 
types of manipulations during the democratic transition and consoli-
dation. First, we evaluate if the municipalities lined up with the central 
government coalition parties were systematically benefited. In line with 
the reasoning above, we expect higher levels of partisan redistributions 
during the early years, and eventually to their disappearance once de-
mocracy took root. Second, we wonder whether allocations vary along 
the election cycle. Cross-country analyses show larger fluctuations in 
young democracies, inferring that the experience of democratization 
reduces political budget cycles (Brender and Drazen, 2005; De Haan, 
2014; Eibl and Lynge-Mangueira, 2017; Mandon and Cazals, 2019; 
Shmuel, 2020). Our argument, yet, points in another direction. Since 
competition strengthens the incentives to convince a wider audience, 
distributive politics shifts from targeting core areas to generalized 
transfer increments just before elections. 
Chile is an appropriate case to study how the institutionalization of 
democratic practices moulds distributive strategies. Unlike other violent 
regime changes, Chile was benefitted from a peaceful transition, despite 
the persistence of structural socioeconomic inequalities and certain 
legacies of Pinochet’s dictatorship. From the year 2005 onwards, dem-
ocratic rules entrenched, competition increased and the parliament was 
balanced between left and right political forces. Our dataset includes 
infrastructure investment at the municipal level by the Ministry of 
Public Works between 1989 and 2018, local and national electoral re-
sults, and socioeconomic data as control variables. We focus on the local 
level since previous studies have shown that municipalities are an 
appropriate scale for targeting spending on electoral criteria (Corvalan 
et al., 2018; Lara and Toro, 2019; Tavits, 2009). For analytical purposes, 
we differentiate two phases: from the first elections to the constitutional 
reforms that put an end to the last traces of Pinochet’s regime 
(1989–2005), and the consolidation stage (2006–2018). The econo-
metric approach relies on two-way fixed-effects (FE) heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation robust estimations with municipal and time effects. 
This paper contributes to understanding the relationship between 
electoral stimulus and the provision of public goods in three major ways. 
First, the sample covers 30 years of the post-Pinochet era, which is the 
longest period of any study of distributive politics in Chile so far. Second, 
most studies have dealt with cross-country differences in terms of the 
degree of democracy and other institutional variables, but analyses that 
account for within country variations are scarcer. Third, estimations 
demonstrate that democratic experience does not reduce the likelihood 
that incumbents would engage in fiscal opportunism, but changes the 
targeting strategy. Contrary to former research that found larger budget 
cycles in new democracies, we find regular fiscal manipulations in both 
periods. However, cycles differ in scope and magnitude. During the 
transition investment rose just in aligned municipalities, yet as de-
mocracy matured, ballot years led to larger and generalized increments 
regardless of partisan ties. The latter uncovers the political budget cycle 
as a recurrent strategy to attract votes, and highlights how electoral 
competition and institutional constraints carve the nature and magni-
tude of cycles. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The literature review discusses the 
two electoral distortions we inspect in young and old democracies. We 
then operationalise the concepts of transition and consolidation that will 
guide our analysis, and discuss the most relevant elements of the Chilean 
transition. Section five explains the research design and section six 
presents the results. In section seven, we relate our results to the insti-
tutional changes and the evolution of electoral competition in Chile 
since the onset of democracy. The article concludes with a summary of 
the paper’s contributions and a discussion on why distributive politics 
changed as democracy evolved. 
2. Distributive politics in old and young democracies 
Over the past few decades, research on distributive politics has 
brought to light the different ways in which office-seeking politicians 
use fiscal variables to improve their electoral expectations. One of the 
most spread tactic is targeting the areas where they enjoy political 
support (Bonvecchi and Lodola, 2010; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; 
Livert and Gainza, 2018; Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). Two com-
plementary rationales provide sound arguments in those regards. 
Incumbent parties may want to reward their bulwarks for their past 
loyalty and keep their electoral base connected for future disputes. Be-
sides, they can use collective goods to spread the party’s power across 
the territory for the mutual advantage of mayoral and presidential 
candidates: by showering areas dominated by akin counterparts, they 
can bolster the image of fellow politicians, which, in turn, is likely to 
enhance the party’s expectations in the national clash (Tavits, 2009). In 
other words, controlling local politics helps winning national elections. 
Taking into account the fiscal dependence of local authorities, in-
cumbents hold an array of instruments to target municipalities. These 
include not only regular transfers from the central to the local level, but 
also public goods geared to particular population subgroups (i.e., 
employment, social assistance programs) or areas (i.e., infrastructure). 
Public works are particularly appropriate for the distributive game. 
Transfers are often allocated on a formula basis, restraining the possi-
bilities for selecting beneficiaries voluntarily. Conversely, the allocation 
of public works (roads, basic social infrastructure) is more open to 
arbitrariness, which allows politicians to select jurisdictions based on 
political criteria, for example, the partisan affiliation of local officials 
(Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). Moreover, public works is highly visible to 
the electorate. Indeed, the partisan use of infrastructure is backed by 
ample anecdotal evidence. Between 1979 and 1984 the Brazilian gov-
ernment paved 6000 km of new roads while leaving another 8000 km 
unmaintained, so that by 1985 the quality of its infrastructure had 
deteriorated (Jordan and Livert, 2016). Through ethnographic research, 
Diamond (2021) reports on the clientelistic practices established be-
tween Colombian mayoral candidates and the electorate. He describes a 
wide range of exchanges in which voters contributed in various ways to 
electoral campaigns, contributions they expected to give them privi-
leged access to public goods when their candidate won. 
Another way to improve the electoral chances is adopting expan-
sionary practices ahead elections, known as political budget cycles 
(PBC). The basic proposition is that the electorate is backward looking 
and evaluates the government’s recent actions (Alesina, 1989); as a 
result, favourable conditions will boost incumbents’ re-election chances. 
PBC scholarship assumes that cycles depend on certain economic, 
political and institutional conditions (De Haan and Klomp, 2013). 
Cross-country analyses have found larger budget cycles in developing 
countries than in developed economies (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Streb 
et al., 2009). Regarding institutions, Alt and Rose (2006) indicate that 
cycles’ magnitude is context-conditional, i.e., a function of the circum-
stances under which policymakers have greater incentives and ability to 
manipulate fiscal variables. Incentives are determined by institutional 
constraints such as term limits or electoral competition, whereas the 
ability to distort government finances is shaped by different factors, 
including the electoral system, the lack of transparency that leads to 
information asymmetries between voters and politicians, and fiscal rules 
(for instance, bans on deficits). 
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A particularly relevant discussion for our research is whether a 
country’s experience with democracy reduces the margin for discre-
tionary spending. Most analyses seem to suggest that maturity improves 
institutional performance. Looking at the systematic differences be-
tween younger and older democracies, Keefer (2007) notes that the 
former are more corrupt and overprovide targeted spending to partic-
ular population subgroups (employment, public works) at the expense of 
non-targeted, general goods (education, property rights). The reason lies 
in the inability of competitors to make credible promises. If the elec-
torate does not believe in electoral promises, the provision of general 
goods yields no gain, whereas the motivations to provide specific goods 
are strong as they are visible and do not require much credibility from 
politicians. A similar conclusion is drawn from Díaz-Cayeros et al. 
(2016) extensive analysis of Mexican distributive politics. During PRI’s 
hegemony, social programs were not successful because resources were 
deviated to areas and population groups following the interests of the 
dominant party. This situation began to change when the opposition 
acquired power. Electoral competition restrained patronage and pork 
barrelling, created incentives to separate politics from the administra-
tion and encouraged policy to shift from discretionary social spending to 
formula-based transfer schemes (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). 
PBC scholarship has also found sharper fluctuations in younger de-
mocracies than in mature ones (De Haan, 2014). In a ground-breaking 
paper, Brender and Drazen (2005) used a sample of countries to test if 
being a new or old democracy has a compelling impact on fiscal 
opportunism. They found larger cycles in new democracies compared to 
established regimes, and linked these results to electorate’s inexperience 
with politics and the lack of information needed to evaluate fiscal ma-
nipulations. Likewise, Shmuel (2020) analysed PBCs in different regimes 
and hypothesized a non-linear relationship between the degrees of de-
mocracy and the extent of budget cycles. He argues that the magnitude 
depends on its leaders’ incentives to win elections and how capable of 
manipulating the economic instruments they are. Strong autocrats have 
the ability to intervene the economy at will, but they are not particularly 
interested since they do not face a credible opposition; on the contrary, 
leaders in strong democracies have incentives to manipulate, but insti-
tutional constraints prevent them from taking those steps. As a result, 
PBCs are greater in weak autocracies and weak democracies rather than 
in strong regimes. 
A number of institutional constraints have been identified explaining 
why young democracies exhibit stronger cycles. Several studies have 
highlighted the role of transparency. For instance, Veiga et al. (2017) 
relate country differences to information asymmetries amid politicians 
and the electorate. In particular, they identify media freedom as the 
most critical factor. Their major conclusion is that, when media freedom 
is low, information about incumbents’ fiscal policy is scarcer and the 
electoral effect stronger. In their analysis of Russia’s early democratic 
years, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) come to a similar conclusion 
when they stress government transparency and media freedom as key 
determinants for reducing cycles’ magnitude. 
The importance of checks-and-balances has also been raised. 
Compared to new democracies, well established democracies have 
stronger oversight mechanisms that limit governments’ discretion. 
Using Brender and Drazen’s (2005) database, Streb et al. (2009) found 
that effective checks-and-balances have a moderating effect on PBC, but 
they suggest that for these to be effective, a legislative veto player and 
high compliance with the law should be accomplished. Gootjes et al. 
(2020) focus specifically on fiscal rules and detect that these curb PBCs, 
even after controlling for media freedom and government debt. Never-
theless, the effect depends on the age of democracy, since their results 
indicate that fiscal rules constrain manipulations in established regimes, 
whereas in new democracies PBCs are present irrespective of these 
factors. 
A third set of institutional features relate to the conditions under 
which the electoral contest occurs. Using a sample of developing 
countries, Prichard (2018) validates that when elections are 
competitive, pre-election tax collection lessens. Shelton (2014) shifts the 
focus to the strength and institutionalization of party systems. In new 
democracies, parties are usually weaker and constituencies are not 
particularly bind to certain policies or organizations, which forms the 
breeding ground for personal candidacies and patronage. By contrast, in 
an institutional setting characterized by an entrenched party system the 
reasons for engaging in budget cycles dampen because parties have 
broader policy goals, voters develop stronger party identification and a 
personal politics that leads to clientelism is less likely to emerge. 
The discussion above seems to indicate that democratic experience 
reduces the scope for administering resources at will, but three caveats 
have to be considered. First, most studies, particularly in the PBC 
literature, explore cross-country differences in terms of their democratic 
experience, but fewer account for within country variations as de-
mocracy settles down. While the former are useful in pointing out the 
importance of institutional factors, they do not allow us to see how 
distributive strategies have evolved. Furthermore, although in aggregate 
terms, higher levels of democracy may improve institutional perfor-
mance, this does not mean that in certain circumstances, democratising 
processes result in higher levels of manipulation. In one of the few 
country studies that track variations over time, Gonzalez (2002) dis-
closed that in Mexico, the magnitude of the cycle was aggravated during 
the country’s most democratic episodes. This is not just a reminder that 
there is no straightforward link between democracy and institutional 
performance, it also raises the question about what other factors make 
distributive strategies to vary. 
The latter leads us to our second caveat: institutional constraints may 
dampen manipulations, but other forces operate in the opposite direc-
tion. In particular, electoral competition. If incumbents fear losing 
elections, they have stimulus to intervene in the economy to assure their 
position. As Eibl and Lynge-Mangueira (2017) explain, democratization 
involves the introduction of substantial constraints on the executive and 
an intensification of the struggle for power, two forces that have reverse 
effects: the first reduces incumbents’ ability to manipulate fiscal vari-
ables; the second increases their incentive. Although this trade-off can 
lead to numerous equilibriums in different settings, we argue that 
competition triggers a shift in strategy. Initially, low rivalry makes 
focusing on strongholds a safe tactic to maintain the status quo, but as 
competition increases, incumbents will need to appeal to a wider and 
more heterogeneous electorate. 
The third caveat refers to the way we operationalise young and old 
democracies. We discuss this point in the next section. 
3. Operationalizing young and old democracies 
Any analysis of the impact of democratization on distributive stra-
tegies is contingent on what is meant by young and old or consolidated 
democracy.1 In general terms, consolidation is the process in which the 
new democratic rules become progressively routinized and embraced by 
the relevant political actors (Kostelka, 2017, p.655), or in Linz and 
Stepan’s (1996) words, when democracy becomes “the only game in 
town”. In retrospect, it alludes to a situation in which the risk of an 
authoritarian reversal is hardly likely (Gasiorowski and Power, 1998; 
Svolik, 2015). However, there is no consensus about the elements that 
make a democracy well established. At the most basic level, it involves 
the entrenchment of an electoral democracy, which in Robert Dahl’s 
conceptualization of “polyarchy” includes clean elections, freedom of 
association, universal suffrage, an elected executive, freedom of 
expression and alternative sources of information. Linz and Stepan 
1 At this point, a clarification is in order. We associate young democracies 
with the period between the first elections and the entrenchment of the dem-
ocratic practices (the term transition also refers to this period), whereas we 
identify consolidated or old democracies with the stage immediately after, i.e. 
when the rules are well established and accepted by all relevant political actors. 
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(1996), though, stress that, for a transition to be completed, attitudes 
and habits have to be cultivated. Accordingly, they propose a definition 
that combines behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions.2 
Others move into maximalists definitions and associate consolidation 
with improvements in the quality of democracy, but as Schedler (1998, 
p.104) notes, these attempts open the door to include any kinds of goals 
and criteria that one deems to be indispensable for a high-quality and thus 
“consolidated” democracy. 
While the debate above shows how ambiguous the boundary be-
tween new and old democracies is, there has been much less discussion 
on how to operationalise these terms. Most of the empirical analyses 
associate consolidation with longevity. For instance, Kostelka (2017) 
considers twenty years of democratic experience because the probability 
of democratic breakdown is significantly reduced by the end of the 
second democratic decade. Within the PBC literature, Klomp and De 
Haan (2011) also adhere to a twenty year period, whereas Brender and 
Drazen (2005), Gootjes et al. (2020) and Veiga et al. (2020) set the 
frontier in four competitive elections. Yet longevity alone could be 
problematic if there is no change in the ruling party. To avoid this issue, 
Gasiorowski and Power (1998) consider regime duration along with 
alternation in the executive power. In a similar vein, Barberia and 
Avelino (2011) tested the existence of PBCs in Latin American countries 
under different specifications, and found the effect is contingent on the 
definition. When they contemplated transition as the stage comprising 
the first four elections, they found that democratization reduces the 
magnitude of budget cycles, but if the consolidation is marked by the 
alternation in power, they found no statistical association. 
Even though durability is an attribute of consolidation, durability by 
itself does not ensure the entrenchment of democracy (Valenzuela, 
1990). In this sense, Schneider and Schmitter (2004) elaborate a 12 item 
list in order to identify when a democracy can be acknowledged as 
consolidated: no significant political party advocates for major changes 
in the constitution; regular elections are held and their outcomes are 
respected; elections have been free and fair; no significant parties or 
groups reject previous electoral conditions; electoral volatility has 
diminished significantly; elected officials and representatives are not 
constrained in their behaviour by non-elected veto groups; a first 
rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has 
occurred; a second rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of 
parties in power has occurred; agreement, formal and informal, has been 
reached on: the rules governing the association formation and behav-
iour, the rules governing the executive format, the rules governing the 
territorial division of competencies and the rules governing ownership 
and access to mass media. While it should not be interpreted as an 
exhaustive closed list, it does give an idea of different political accom-
plishment that characterize consolidated democracies. In operational 
terms, it provides a richer approach that complements those based on 
time or alternation in power. The latter is particularly relevant for case 
analyses because it can be tailored to the landmarks that marked the 
transition in the country. For the purpose of this investigation, we adopt 
an approach that combines time with the main events of the Chilean way 
towards democratic consolidation. We explore this next. 
4. Transition and consolidation of Chilean democracy 
For long, Chile’s transition has been regarded as a model. After 
seventeen-year dictatorship, Chileans rejected Augusto Pinochet in a 
plebiscite in 1988, the first elections were held in 1989 and democracy 
returned in 1990. Since then, centre-left and centre-right coalitions have 
been governing, the country has experienced political stability and 
sustained economic growth rates and, until the 2019–2020 riots, few 
would have hesitated to consider it as one of Latin America’s most 
successful democracies. 
However, the Chilean transition was not so exemplary. The military 
government left the constitutional framework and several “authoritarian 
enclaves” in place (Garretón, 2004). Three enclaves were of particular 
relevance (Garretón and Garretón, 2010): the Constitution, the high 
quorums needed to amend fundamental laws and the ‘binomial’ elec-
toral rule. Approved, under the military rule in 1980, the Constitution 
granted senatorial seats to non-elected representatives of the armed 
forces, including the “senator for life” position for Augusto Pinochet. On 
the other hand, several fundamental laws required very high quorums 
for their reform, which privileged the maintenance of constraining 
factors inherited from the dictatorship. A third element was a ‘binomial’ 
electoral rule that restricted competition in national elections to two 
mayor coalitions.3 
In 2005, a constitutional reform erased most of the non-democratic 
elements. Until then, the armed forces remained a constraining factor 
for the president’s authority because they hold several permanent posts 
in the National Security Council, 9 senator seats and the “senator for 
life” position for Augusto Pinochet. The amendment removed these 
senatorial seats and, later, the Supreme Court dropped Pinochet’s im-
munity for the crimes committed during the military rule (Center for 
Systemic Peace, 2010). As Siavelis (2009, p. 5) argues, Chile finally found 
the basic norms of democracy established by Linz and Stepan, given that “the 
executive, legislative and judicial powers generated by the new democracy” 
no longer had to “share power with other de jure organs” (emphasis in the 
original). 
Several authors have pointed to the reform as the turning point for 
the entrenchment of Chilean democracy (Center for Systemic Peace, 
2010; Navia, 2010; Siavelis, 2009). We agree on that view: it occurred at 
a time close to the two decades that most empirical analyses considered 
the consolidation threshold, and matched the fourth presidential elec-
tion, which Brender and Drazen (2005), Gootjes et al. (2020) and Veiga 
et al. (2017) took as the frontier. Indeed, from this point onwards, we 
find some elements marking the end of a transition. On the one hand, the 
constitutional amendment meant that representatives were no longer 
constrained by non-elected veto groups. On the other hand, this year 
lead to a shift in alliances of parties in power. Although it cannot be 
considered a rotation-in-power, the 2005 election brought the first so-
cialist president since the military coup, Michelle Bachelet. The 
centre-left coalition dominated Chilean politics during the first two 
decades (1989–2009), but previous candidates belonged to the Christian 
Democratic Party and the Party for Democracy. Bachelet’s election was a 
game changer as the first female and socialist president. 
5. Research design 
The empirical approach contemplates investment transfers from the 
Ministry of Public Works (MOP) to Chilean municipalities between 1989 
and 2018 (roads, street pavement, lightning, etc.). It includes both, new 
investment (about one third) and maintenance (about two thirds, see 
2 Behaviourally, a democratic regime is consolidated when ‘no significant 
political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede 
from the state’. Attitudinally, when ‘the overwhelming majority of the people 
believe that any further political change must emerge from within the param-
eters of democratic formulas’. Constitutionally, when all actors in the polity, 
governmental and non-governmental alike, ‘become subjected to, and habitu-
ated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures and in-
stitutions sanctioned by the new democratic process’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 
p.5). 
3 Under the binomial rule, only two seats are assigned per constituency, and 
one list must double the other to obtain the two seats, otherwise the runner-up 
list takes the second seat. This rule has been criticized on several fronts: it tends 
to over represent the second political party, it excludes de facto a third party 
from seats and displaces competition from forces to competition within blocks. 
X. Gainza et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Electoral Studies 73 (2021) 102377
5
Annex 1). Investment is an adequate category to analyse the existence of 
tactical redistributions for two reasons. Public infrastructure projects are 
discretionary and excludable on a territorial basis, i.e., they can be used 
to please certain constituencies and exclude others (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 
2016). Besides, the allocation process leaves room for arbitrariness. 
Chile’s decision-making process for infrastructure projects is not based 
on a formal set of criteria (OECD, 2017). The MOP determines the needs 
and the strategies that will be addressed, but there is limited coordina-
tion across policy areas and levels of government. Arbitrariness is fuelled 
by the lack of medium- to long-term planning procedures, as incumbents 
can match the budgeting timetable with the electoral calendar (Livert 
and Gainza, 2018). Over the thirty years that make our sample, public 
works accounted for 38% of government investment, 3% of gross fixed 
capital formation and 0.8% of GDP (see Annex 1). Although in absolute 
terms it was evenly distributed across the country, the remote regions of 
the North and South attracted the highest per capita investment due to 
their low population rates and difficult accessibility (See Annex 2). 
We took electoral data to construct a set of independent variables. 
First of all, we created three variables to scrutinize potential partisan 
influence (Table 1): a dummy that takes the value one if the mayor 
belongs to one of the political parties of the central government coalition 
(m); a dummy equal to one if the government coalition parties won 
presidential elections in the municipality (p); and a dummy coded one if 
the mayor belongs to one of the coalition parties and the coalition won 
presidential elections in the municipality (mp). The sample includes 
seven local (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016) and seven 
presidential elections (1989, 1993, 1999, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017) 
that resulted in four different coalitions: the centre-left Concertación in 
1989–2009 and Nueva Mayoría in 2014–2017, and the centre-right 
Alianza in 2010–2013 and Chile Vamos in 2018.4 The dummies fluctu-
ated according to national and local dispute, but the three groups of 
municipalities decreased over time, indicative of increasing competition 
(Annex 3).5 We also included the victory margin in municipal elections 
computed as the percentage difference between the winner and the 
second, an indicator used to measure competition (see Table 2). 
Apart from partisanship, we tested the extent of political budget 
cycles. In Chile, municipal and presidential dispute are in October and 
November/December respectively, but these are separated by one-year 
distance. Dates are fixed and both, incumbents and the electorate, are 
aware of them in advance, so elections were considered exogenous to 
allocation decisions. Since these take place in the last term and much of 
the public investment consists of minor works and maintenance that 
become visible within less than a year, we deem reasonable to focus on 
election years to check whether fiscal expansions occur as local and 
national races approach. Consequently, we followed the “rule of the 
year” (Barberia and Avelino, 2011; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Livert 
and Gainza, 2018), and created a dichotomous dummy coded one for 
local ballot years (ym0), and another dummy for national ballot years 
(yp0). 
In addition to electoral data, we introduced control variables: pop-
ulation (log); regional GDP per capita; regional GDP growth rate in t and 
t-1; the percentage of new-borns measuring less than 50 cm; the per-
centage of new-borns weighting less than 3000 gr; and the percentage of 
mothers with more than three children. In the absence of poverty in-
dicators for the whole sample series, the latter accounted for proxies 
since they are correlated with municipalities’ socioeconomic conditions 
(Mardones and Acuña, 2020). Population data is from the National 
Statistics Institute, GDP data from the Central Bank and poverty proxies 
from Mardones and Acuña (2020). 
We estimated three econometric models using fixed-effects (FE), 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust estimations with munic-
ipal and time effects. While municipal fixed-effects controlled for place- 
specific factors that are fixed over time, the year fixed-effects controlled 
for factors that vary over time but are common across all municipalities. 
Table 1 
Type of municipalities depending on electoral results.   
The government 
coalition won in 
the presidential 
election 
The mayor belongs to a political party of the central 
government coalition  
Yes No 




No √ × (p) × ×
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics.  
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
investment 
(log) 
Investment by the 
ministry of public 




6657 12.69085 2.557552 
yp0 Dummy equal to 1 for 
presidential election 
year, 0 otherwise 
10,350 0.2333333 0.422973 
ym0 Dummy equal to 1 for 
municipal election 
year, 0 otherwise 
10,350 0.2333333 0.422973 
m Dummy equal to 1 if 
mayors belong to the 
incumbent coalition 
parties, 0 otherwise 
10,350 0.4173913 0.4931524 





10,350 0.7275362 0.4452487 
mp Dummy equal to 1 if 
mayors belong to the 
incumbent coalition 





10,350 0.3330435 0.4713247 
population Annual population 10,226 45656.27 70267.39 
h_50 Percentage of newborns 
measuring less than 50 
cm 
9484 46.54328 10.37179 
weight_3000 Percentage of newborns 
weighting less than 
3000 g 
9484 21.08883 6.610066 
3_child Percentage of mothers 
who had more than 3 
children 




Regional GDP growth 
rate in the previous 
year 
10,350 0.01778868 0.07406291 
regional 
growth (t) 
Regional GDP growth 
rate 
10,350 0.01773839 0.07406952 
regional 
GDPpc 
Regional GDP per 
capita 
10,350 3,927,565 8,554,620 
mv_pres Victory margin in 
presidential elections 
10,235 14.67641 22.28649 
mv_mun Victory margin in 
municipal elections 
9210 15.96595 14.01527  
4 Coalitions split along the left-right axis. These include major parties (so-
cialist PS and democrats PDC and PPD in the left; UDI and RN in the right) as 
well as other smaller parties that support them. Independent mayors were 
excluded from both coalitions.  
5 We conducted a two-sample t-test with unequal variances to check whether 
the differences from one election to another were statistically significant. The 
test certified mean differences for m and p at p < 0.01. 
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Robust standard errors were clustered at the municipal scale to control 
for serial and spatial correlation. Zits stands for a vector gathering control 
variables in every model. 
log( investmentit)= α+ β1 mit + β2 pit + β3 mpit + γZit + σi + τt + uit (1)  
log(investmentit)= α+ β1 mit + β2 pit + β3 mpit + β4 ym0t + β5 (mit x ym0t)
+ β6 (pit x ym0t)+ β7 (mpit x ym0t)+ γZit + σi + τt + uit
(2)  
log(investmentit)= α+ β1 mit + β2 pit + β3 mpit + β4 yp0t + β5 (mit x yp0t)
+ β6 (pit x yp0t)+ β7 (mpit x yp0t)+ γZit + σi + τt + uit
(3) 
Model 1 tested potential leanings in favour of the three groups of 
municipalities (m, p, mp). Models 2 and 3 dealt with the political budget 
cycle, but while Model 2 examined the impact of municipal contests, 
Model 3 considered presidential elections. Both worked with interaction 
terms for election years and municipality to weight the budget cycle in 
aligned and rival municipalities, a usual procedure in the literature 
(Corvalan et al., 2018; Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2019). Additionally, 
we regressed these three models including the interaction between the 
partisan effect and the vote margin. Although our main goal was not to 
address the incidence of electoral competition, we appraised the impact 
of partisan politics by interacting with the margin variable. 
We divided the sample in two periods to assess whether fiscal 
opportunism decreased as democracy evolved: the transition stage 
(1989–2005) and the democratic consolidation stage (2006–2018). As 
discussed in the previous section, we took the 2005 constitutional re-
forms as the turning point for consolidation. Nonetheless, we checked 
also the robustness of our models for other transition thresholds. 
6. Results 
6.1. Distributive politics in Chile (1989–2018) 
The first set of analyses examines the pattern of distributive politics 
within the whole sample years (Table 3). The most basic Model 1 in-
spects whether there is a partisan skew in the distribution of investment. 
The positive sign of the coefficient for the interaction between municipal 
and presidential electoral results (mp) reveals that in Chile, the munic-
ipalities where the government coalition parties won in presidential 
elections and the mayor belongs to one of these parties, have been 
systematically benefited. This finding advances the existence of certain 
favouritism for the most loyal constituencies and indicates that alloca-
tions credited both, presidential and mayoral dispute. Targeting areas 
where the central government incumbent party rules the town council 
allows for a coordinated action between the two tiers to cement their 
position in the locality. Mayors are an important ingredient of the 
strategy because they can mobilize the local electorate and consolidate 
the partisan advantage. In exchange, incumbent parties allocate an out 
of proportion share of investment looking for the electoral returns in the 
national dispute. 
Based on the results of Model 1, Equation (4) captures this “mayoral 
effect” i.e., among the municipalities that voted by majority for the 
incumbent coalition in the presidential elections, how much investment 
has been diverted to the municipalities that hold also a fellow mayor.6 
According to our estimations, these obtained 18.2% extra investment, 
compared to those that voted for the incumbent coalition in the presi-
dential elections but the opposition rules the local administration. 
log(investmentit)=α − 0.239(m)it − 0.0417 (p)it + 0.421 (m*p)it + γZit + σi + τt
+ uit
(4) 
Moving now into budget cycles, we first appraised the incidence of 
municipal elections. Investment increased significantly during local 
ballot years (ym0), indicative of a municipal budget cycle (Model 2). It is 
worth analysing the effect, though, in conjunction with the results of the 
ruling coalition in the municipality to grasp whether aligned constitu-
encies are particularly favoured ahead elections or not (Model 2 
Extended). This exercise uncovers a partisan cycle complementing the 
municipal budget cycle, as core municipalities (mp) were the most 
benefited in election years. If we replicate the exercise above and 
examine the mayoral effect, we observe that investment raised by 20.4% 
in the municipalities that voted for the coalition parties in presidential 
and municipal elections,7 compared to the areas that supported the 
incumbent coalition in the presidential elections but the opposition is in 
charge of the local administration. Model 3 and Model 3 Extended 
accounted for the presidential cycle. Results show that investment rose 
during presidential ballot years (yp0) indicative of a presidential cycle, 
but in this case, there is no systematic differentiation between allied and 
non-allied areas. 
We performed two tests to check the consistency of our results. First, 
we included the victory margin in municipal elections as an additional 
control and interacted this variable with mp. The results can be 
compared in Annex 4. The mp variable remains statistically significant 
although its coefficient is somewhat reduced and the mayoral effect 
drops to 12.3%. All other results remain: core municipalities gain extra 
investment during municipal election years, and the significance of yp0 
Table 3 
Distributive politics in Chile 1989–2018.  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2a Model 2 
extended 
Model 3a Model 3 
extended 
m − 0.239* − 0.239* − 0.436*** − 0.239* − 0.217 
(0.142) (0.142) (0.162) (0.142) (0.157) 
p − 0.0417 − 0.0419 − 0.0491 − 0.0417 − 0.0144 
(0.114) (0.114) (0.121) (0.114) (0.128) 
mp 0.421** 0.421** 0.616*** 0.421** 0.389** 
(0.164) (0.164) (0.190) (0.164) (0.185) 
ym0  2.815*** 2.690***   
(0.404) (0.584) 
ym0_m   0.648***   
(0.247) 
ym0_p   0.0166   
(0.164) 
ym0_mp   − 0.624**   
(0.296) 
yp0    1.883*** 1.981*** 
(0.564) (0.588) 
yp0_m     − 0.0921 
(0.288) 
yp0_p     − 0.109 
(0.199) 
yp0_mp     0.135 
(0.311) 
Constant 10.84*** 11.31*** 10.81*** 10.84*** 10.81*** 
(2.163) (0.458) (2.161) (2.163) (2.164) 
Observations 6198 6198 6198 6198 6198 
R-squared 0.108 0.108 0.109 0.108 0.108 
Number of id 343 343 343 343 343 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Fixed-effects estimations with standard errors, clustered by municipality. 
P-values reported in parenthesis ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
6 The “mayoral effect” is expressed as: ∂log(investment)∂m = − 0.239+ 0.421* p. If 
p dummy takes the value 1, then. ∂log(investment)∂m = 0.182 
7 We compute the mayoral effect as follows. ∂log(investment)∂m = m+ (m *ym0)+
(m *p)+ (m *p *ym0) = − 0.436+ 0,648+ 0, 616 − 0, 624 = 0.204 
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confirms the existence of a presidential budget cycle. 
Second, we checked the accuracy of our estimations using General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM). Although a FE strategy provides a 
sound methodological basis, results could be biased if investment is 
endogenous to past decisions as several infrastructure projects extend 
over one period. Consequently, we relied on difference-GMM (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) treating variables as endogenous to past performance. 
The results suggest that endogeneity is not a serious issue. The Arella-
no–Bond tests for AR1 and AR2 report no second-order serial autocor-
relation, whereas the Hansen test indicates that instrumental variables 
are valid. The GMM estimator confirms the partisan effect for mp and the 
existence of a municipal and presidential political budget cycle (See 
Annex 5). In consequence, and taking into consideration the higher 
reliability of the FE estimator,8 hereafter we lean on FE specifications. 
This first exercise disclosed how, in Chile, infrastructure investment 
has been used with electoral aims since the onset of democracy. In the 
following, we examine if the manoeuvre for fiscal manipulation has 
changed as democratic practices settled. 
6.2. Distributive politics during the democratic transition (1989–2005) 
and the consolidation stage (2006–2018) 
Tables 4–6 compare the pattern of distributive politics during the 
democratic transition (1989–2005) and the consolidation stage 
(2006–2018). Table 4 reflects no partisan leanings when we split the 
sample since m, p and mp are not statistically significant. However, when 
taking a closer look to the budget cycle, it does show a marked prefer-
ence for core municipalities (mp) as elections approach. 
If we turn first to municipal budget cycle (Table 5), during the 
transition, the variable ym0 is not statistically significant, which sug-
gests there was no widespread increase as local elections approached. 
Yet, an opportunistic cycle in favour of core municipalities can be 
noticed. The coefficients for the interaction between ym0 and mp are 
statistically significant, indicative of a targeting strategy for the sake of 
aligned municipalities. The mayoral effect means that public works 
spending rose by 18.3% in those constituencies that voted for the 
presidential coalition and hold an akin mayor.9 
Surprisingly, the municipal political budget cycle changed in nature 
as democracy ripened. During the consolidation stage, investment rose 
in every municipality, regardless of mayoral allegiance or presidential 
election results (ym0 is statistically significant, but there is no 
meaningful association for the interaction with mp). Hence, as demo-
cratic culture blossomed, incumbents modified their strategy from tar-
geting core areas, to widespread transfer increases prior to elections. The 
magnitude of the municipal PBC is striking, since investment transfers 
rose up to 312% in election years, compared to non-ballot years. 
Table 6 gathers the incidence of presidential PBC. In the first years 
after Pinochet’s dictatorship, we find no traces of election cycle, but 
after the democratic reforms, investment rose systematically prior to 
presidential polls (yp0 is statistically significant). Thus, a presidential 
cycle overlapped the municipal cycle. The magnitude once again is 
remarkable, as public works spending increased by as much as 277% in 
the presidential election year. 
Fig. 1 presents the predicted investment in mp (green) and non-mp 
municipalities (red) to provide some graphical evidence of the nature 
and magnitude of the PBC. As can be seen, mp municipalities attracted 
Table 4 
Partisan bias during transition and democratic consolidation.  
VARIABLES 1989–2005 2006–2018 
m − 0.157 − 0.208 
(0.222) (0.215) 
p − 0.0265 − 0.0400 
(0.222) (0.132) 
mp 0.380 0.357 
(0.253) (0.241) 
Constant 6.731* 14.08*** 
(3.597) (4.268) 
Observations 3.073 3.125 
R-squared 0.025 0.115 
Number of id 320 341 
Municipal FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Controls YES YES 
Note: Fixed-effects estimations with standard errors, clustered by municipality. 
P-values reported in parenthesis ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Table 5 
Municipal PBC during transition and democratic consolidation.  
Variables 1989–2005 1989–2005 2006–2018 2006–2018 
ym0 0.0731 0.000596 3.125*** 2.972*** 
(0.574) (0.624) (0.327) (0.373) 
ym0_m  0.855***  0.229 
(0.324) (0.335) 
ym0_p/  − 0.0449  0.0726 
(0.277) (0.192) 
ym0_mp  − 0.937**  − 0.0232 
(0.398) (0.387) 
m − 0.157 − 0.447* − 0.208 − 0.265 
(0.222) (0.248) (0.215) (0.237) 
p − 0.0265 − 0.0146 − 0.0400 − 0.0583 
(0.222) (0.237) (0.132) (0.137) 
mp 0.380 0.712** 0.357 0.360 
(0.253) (0.288) (0.241) (0.271) 
Constant 6.731* 6.558* 14.08*** 14.05*** 
(3.597) (3.592) (4.268) (4.285) 
Observations 3073 3073 3125 3125 
R-squared 0.025 0.029 0.115 0.115 
Number of id 320 320 341 341 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Note: Fixed-effects estimations with standard errors, clustered by municipality. 
P-values reported in parenthesis ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Table 6 
Presidential PBC during transition and democratic consolidation.  
Variables 1989–2005 1989–2005 2006–2018 2006–2018 
yp0 − 1.213 − 1.485 2.779*** 3.224*** 
(0.869) (0.921) (0.429) (0.467) 
yp0_m  0.494  − 0.750* 
(0.481) (0.434) 
yp0_p  0.323  − 0.478** 
(0.406) (0.229) 
yp0_mp  − 0.376  0.777* 
(0.534) (0.468) 
m − 0.151 − 0.249 − 0.234 − 0.0233 
(0.221) (0.248) (0.216) (0.251) 
p 0.00480 − 0.0466 − 0.0599 0.0886 
(0.219) (0.230) (0.134) (0.161) 
mp 0.356 0.414 0.393 0.169 
(0.251) (0.278) (0.243) (0.278) 
Constant − 21.68 − 20.79 44.32** 44.13** 
(15.67) (15.60) (17.48) (17.46) 
Observations 3073 3073 3125 3125 
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.115 0.117 
Number of id 320 320 341 341 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Note: Fixed-effects estimations with standard errors, clustered by municipality. 
P-values reported in parenthesis ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
8 Although GMM is attractive to handle regressors’ potential endogeneity, it 
also introduces discretion when treating instruments and lags.  
9 The mayoral effect is calculated as: ∂log(investment)∂m = m+ (m *ym0)+ (m *p)+
(m *p *ym0) = − 0.447+ 0,855+ 0,712 − 0, 937 = 0.183. 
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significantly more investment, especially during local ballot years (the 
dashed line), but from year 2005 onwards this gap narrows as invest-
ment reaches both groups. 
We conducted three additional tests to weight the robustness of our 
analysis. As we did for the whole sample, we first included the victory 
margin and the interaction with mp. The results are displayed in Annex 
6. Although the coefficients are somewhat reduced, the inclusion of the 
victory margin does not modify the main findings: initially, public works 
spending increased before local polls in core constituencies, whereas 
democratic consolidation led to a municipal and a presidential cycle 
across the board. 
In a second exercise, we ran our models considering various victory 
margin thresholds in municipal and presidential elections, i.e. if the 
difference between the first and the second was below 50, 40, 30, 20 and 
10 percent. We wanted to check if the incidence of the cycle varied 
depending on how challenging elections were. Table 7 summarizes the 
coefficients and the significance level for the mayoral effect during the 
transition stage, and the coefficients and the significance level for ym0 
and yp0 during the consolidation stage. These results provide further 
evidence of the consistency of our baseline models. During the transition 
stage, the mayoral effect is significant for different victory margin 
thresholds, whereas in the consolidation stage, ym0 and yp0 remain 
statistically significant no matter how contested municipal and presi-
dential elections were. 
Thirdly, we examined whether results were dependent on the defi-
nition of democratic transition or not. Although the 2005 reforms were a 
landmark in the evolution towards democracy, the nature and magni-
tude of the PBC may be sensitive to the year considered to mark the 
boundary between transition and consolidation. Annex 7–10 display the 
results for the municipal and presidential PBC considering different 
thresholds, i.e., if the democratic transition lasted from ten to twenty 
years and, consequently, the consolidation began from the eleventh to 
the twenty-first year. Overall, results are robust to alternative defini-
tions. During the first years, investment benefited core constituencies 
where the ruling coalition enjoyed support in the presidential and 
municipal dispute (mp) ahead municipal elections. As democracy took 
root, the partisan bias disappeared but a significant PBC emerged just 
before both, local and presidential elections. 
7. Institutional constraints and electoral incentives in the 
consolidation of Chilean democracy 
Why did distributive politics vary as Chilean democracy entrenched? 
Previous research has argued that the scope for manipulation diminishes 
as democratic practices settle, but our analysis points in another direc-
tion. In the early years, incumbents targeted stronghold areas, but as 
democracy blossomed, they modified their strategy from focusing in 
core constituencies to widespread PBC. In fact, the magnitude of PBC is 
significantly larger in the consolidation period than in the transition 
stage. Why? 
For us, the answer to this question lies in the tension between 
institutional constraints and electoral incentives outlined above. During 
the past thirty years, Chile has undergone several institutional reforms 
to modernize the state and improve accountability. As an example, in 
2001 an expenditure control rule was established to limit incumbents’ 
ability to increase expenses at discretion. This rule adjusted fiscal bal-
ances by considering the effects of the business cycle, which, in princi-
ple, should have limited incumbents’ ability to relate fiscal variables to 
the electoral calendar. Indeed, it has been acknowledged as a funda-
mental pillar of the country’s macroeconomic stability and an example 
to be followed by other countries (Marcel, 2013). In a similar vein, in-
formation systems and planning processes have improved. In 2005, the 
legal framework for national investment was modified for the first time 
since 1975 to ensure investments included a favourable report based on 
a technical evaluation from the planning authority (https://observatorio 
planificacion.cepal.org/en/regulatory-frameworks/country/1/secto 
rial-topic/129). 
Chile has also improved in terms of transparency. Transparency In-
ternational ranked Chile 21st out of 41 countries in 1996 and 27th out of 
180 in 2018. Nonetheless, several gaps remain, notably in the budgeting 
process. The Open Budget Initiative places Chile far from the OECD 
average and other Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Peru and 
Argentina (International Budget Partnership, 2019a). In particular, it 
stresses the lack of mechanisms to engage the civil society in budget 
formulation and implementation, as well as inadequate oversight pro-
cedures by the Legislative during implementation (International Budget 
Partnership, 2019b). 
More important for us, though, is that the democratization process 
has led to an increasingly competitive environment, thereby altering 
incumbents’ incentives. Since the first municipal elections, the number 
of candidates and the gap between the main contenders has been 
decreasing, especially from 2004 onwards (Fig. 2). The enhanced 
competition in local politics is largely explained by a change in the 
Fig. 1. Investment in core municipalities during the municipal PBC. 
Note: The dashed line corresponds to municipal election years. 
Table 7 
The mayoral effect and the incidence of election years during transition and 
consolidation depending on the victory margin.   
Victory 
Margin 






Vict_marg<50 5974 15.9%** 3.176*** 2.699*** 
Vict_marg 
<40 
5354 43.1%** 3.247*** 2.736*** 
Vict_marg 
<30 
4465 27.2%** 3.126*** 2.678*** 
Vict_marg 
<20 
3496 30.2%** 2.498*** 2.554*** 
Vict_marg 
<10 





5907 14.1%** 3.064*** 2.764*** 
Vict_marg 
<40 
5662 12.9%** 3.138*** 2.700*** 
Vict_marg 
<30 
5221 6.1%* 3.244*** 2.826*** 
Vict_marg 
<20 
4267 13% 3.719*** 3.063*** 
Vict_marg 
<10 
2579 1% 3.682*** 3.416*** 
Note: Fixed-effects estimations with standard errors. clustered by municipality. 
p-values reported in parenthesis ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
a The mayoral effect is calculated as. 
∂log(investment)
∂m = m+ (m *ym0)+
(m *p)+ (m *p *ym0)
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electoral rule. Until then, mayors were directly elected but they had to 
fulfil a set of conditions10. As a result, a winning candidate might not be 
awarded office if she didn’t’ belong to the most voted coalition and vice 
versa, coalition agreements could lead to the most voted candidate not 
being elected (Bunker, 2008). In 2004, the local electoral law was 
reformed so that mayors were elected through relative majority and 
town councillors through the D’Hont rule. The amendment reduced 
coalitions’ power vis-à-vis candidates and altered aspirants’ incentives 
since they could only contend as mayors or councillors. 
National politics has also become more contested. Electoral support 
for the two coalitions that have dominated Chilean politics has been 
declining and new contenders have increased rivalry for the presidential 
dispute.11 For us, the new competitive environment operated a change 
in the distributive tactic. Initially, the low rivalry and the absence of 
oversight rules and procedures meant that the most appropriate strategy 
was to target the municipalities where the ruling party was domi-
neering. In this way, the conditions for winning elections were nurtured. 
Furthermore, targeting the constituencies where the ruling coalition 
enjoyed political support and fellow majors dominated local politics 
allowed for a coordinated action between the two government tiers to 
cement the party’s position in the locality. However, such a targeting 
strategy is no longer adequate when competition increases because 
concentrating in the most loyal electorate is not enough to keep winning 
elections and maintain the status quo. On the contrary, incumbents have 
to appeal to a broader set of voters, thus increasing investment across the 
board as the electoral clash comes closer. 
8. Concluding remarks 
In this research, we have documented the existence of electoral 
motivations in the allocation of investment to Chilean municipalities 
since the onset of democracy. During the early years, the areas where the 
central government enjoyed political support and co-partisans ruled 
local councils were systematically benefited before local polls. This 
targeting strategy speaks of a joint action between local and national 
policymaking to maintain the electoral position of the ruling party in the 
municipality. When the same party commands the municipal and 
national government, voters are not bound to differentiate between tiers 
to elucidate whom should they reward for the new infrastructure. By 
contrast, in the event of a rival party controlling local or national politics 
in the municipality, voters would be required to discriminate who is 
responsible. Such information asymmetries may explain why just the 
most loyal areas were privileged, in spite of the central government 
being in charge of investment decisions. 
As democracy settled, we find no traces of a partisan bias, but con-
trary to PBC literature, we find stronger budget cycles. Initially, in-
vestment rose in ballot years just in the municipalities where the ruling 
party dominated local and national politics, consistent with a targeting 
strategy to assist the most loyal constituencies. As competition 
increased, the fiscal excesses prior to local polls extended to every mu-
nicipality. In addition, a budget cycle matching presidential elections 
emerged. Not only this result discloses political budget cycles as the 
most persistent resource to attract votes, but it also uncovers how fiscal 
manipulations adapt to the rules of the game. 
We believe institutional constraints and incentives can shed light on 
why the PBC changed in nature and increased in magnitude as de-
mocracy matured. In Chile, the progressive modernization of the state 
improved accountability and restrained partisanship in the distribution 
of collective goods, but growing electoral competition moulded politi-
cians’ incentives to influence fiscal outcomes. Competition forced a 
change in the electoral tactic, from targeting just bulwarks to increasing 
transfers across the board before local polls. As the electoral base 
eroded, incumbents’ incentives shifted because it is much more 
restrictive to focus just on the core electorate, than to favour everyone 
prior to elections. 
In short, we should not take for granted a linear, inverse, relationship 
between the degree of democracy and the scope for fiscal opportunism. 
The distributive game is an essential part of democracy because politi-
cians are motivated by their desire to reach and maintain office. Rules, 
competition and a well-informed citizenry will certainly increase control 
and reduce the margin to use public goods at will, but only by under-
standing how institutional constraints interact with electoral incentives, 
it will be possible to grasp context-conditional solutions. 
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